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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
*******************************************************

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
MILLER

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

Criminal Case No. 021501335 FS
vs.
Appellant Case No. 20031009-CA
ROBYN LYNN MILLER,
Argument Priority: (2)

Defendant/Appellant.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter in that it is an appeal
in a criminal case not involving a first degree or capital felony.

Utah Code

Annotated Section 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1953, as amended).
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The issues presented for appeal in this case by Appellant are as follows:
ISSUE NO. 1: Whether or not there was sufficient evidence to convict the
Appellant of the charges set forth in the amended information, under circumstances
where the Appellant was entitled to the funds retrieved from her ex-husband?
ISSUE NO. 2: Whether or not the trial court properly instructed the jury as to
the elements of each offense, by the use of definitions or other instructions at the
time of the trial?
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ISSUE NO. 3: Whether or not the trial court erred in not including an
appropriate instruction to deal with the entitlement to the proceeds acquired through
manipulation of banking forms to gain access to funds in the account of Appellant's
ex-husband?
ISSUE NO. 4: Whether or not Appellant received the effective assistance of
counsel at trial?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard of review for a claim of insufficiency of evidence is to view the
evidence and all inferences that may reasonably be drawn from it in the light most
favorable to the jury verdict. State v. Caver. 814 P.2d 604 (Utah App. 1991); see
also State v. Booker. 709 P.2d 342, 345 (1985). A jury verdict will be reversed only
if the evidence is "sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable" that reasonable
minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the
crime of which she was convicted. Id. State v. Caver. 814 P.2d at 612. The law
does not conclusively presume that because a person signed the name of another
a forgery has occurred. The act of signing another's name without permission does
not constitute forgery unless it is done with the intent to defraud. State v. Winward.
909 P.2d 909,912 (Utah App. 1995). Accordingly, to sustain a conviction of forgery
there must be a sufficient connection between the act of forgery and the intent to
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defraud, see also Hendershott v. People. 653 P.2d 385, 390 (Colo. 1982).
Moreover, even if a defendant possesses both an intent to defraud and commits the
act of signing another's name without authority, a forgery conviction cannot be
sustained unless the act was done in furtherance of the intention to defraud.
Winwardat913.
Where the trial court fails to sufficiently instruct a jury on the concept of
specific intent as it applies to the facts of a case involving forgery, the same
constitutes reversible error, Id. A party who fails to object to or give an instruction
may have that instruction assigned as error under the manifest injustice exception,
Utah R. Crim. P. 19(e). However, a party cannot take advantage of an error
committed at trial when that party led the trial court into committing the error, State
v. Anderson. 929 P.2d 1107,1109 (Utah 1996). Accordingly, a jury instruction may
not be assigned as error even if such an instruction constitutes manifest justice "if
counsel, either by statement or act, affirmatively represents to the trial court that he
or she had no objection to the jury instruction." State v. Hamilton. 2003 UT 22,
paragraph 54, P.3d 111. Where Defendant or his counsel invites error the verdict
will not be overturned even if the jury instruction results in manifest injustice. See
State of Utah v. Geukqeuzian. 204 Utah 16, paragraph 14.
Where representation falls below the standard objective of a reasonable
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professional, sufficiently to overcome the presumption that counsel rendered
adequate assistance and exercised sound professional judgment and where the
case demonstrates that counsel's errors were prejudicial, the representation is
ineffective when there is a reasonable probability that but for such error the outcome
in the proceedings would have been different. See Strictland v. Washington. 466
U.S. 668, 689, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2065, 80 L.Ed. 2d 674 (1985).
STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The Appellant is aware of no statutory provision that is dispositive but believes
the following apply:
Utah
Rule
Utah
Utah
Utah

Code Annotated Section 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1953, as amended)
19(e), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedures
Code Annotated, Section 76-6-501 (1953, as amended)
Code Annotated, Section 76-6-506.2 (1953, as amended)
Code Annotated, Section 76-6-404 (1953, as amended)

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. NATURE of the CASE: This is a criminal case where the Appellant was
charged with three (3) counts of forgery, each a third degree felony, one count of
unlawful use of a financial transaction card, a third degree felony and one count of
theft of property, a third degree felony. The charge of theft of property was reduced
by amended information to a class A misdemeanors before trial, see the record at
page 66. On the 25th day of September, 2003, a one (1) day jury trial was held and
Page 4 of
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the Appellant was convicted on all counts. The charges stem from circumstances
where the Appellant was accused of forging her ex-husband's signature authorizing
her and their fifteen (15) year old daughter to withdraw funds from his personal bank
account at State Bank of Southern Utah beginning in February, 2002. The Appellant
was the ex-wife of the victim, Andrew Miller, having divorced, however, pursuant to
a modified decree he was required to pay child support for two (2) children and if he
were unemployed or incarcerated, all funds from which he received Veteran's
Administration (benefits) were to be sent directly to the Appellant as support. The
funds acquired by Appellant from Andrew's account were benefit proceeds from the
Veteran's Administration since he had no other sources of income while
incarcerated. The State asserted that a forgery was committed when the Appellant
submitted three (3) bank card applications utilizing the victim's checking account
number at State Bank of Southern Utah and where photos from the ATM camera
showed her use the card to obtain funds from his account.
B. COURSE of PROCEEDINGS: Charges were brought against the Appellant
in December, 2002, see the record at page 4.

The Appellant made her first

appearance and was appointed counsel on the 19th day of December, 2002. On or
about the 15th day of January, 2003, the Appellant waived her preliminary hearing
and was bound over for arraignment where she plead not guilty and the matter was
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set for trial. In April, 2003, counsel stipulated to a motion to continue jury trial and
status conference and after further continuance in June, the matter was reset for trial
in September, 2003. The day before trial, an amended information was filed,
reducing Count V, theft of property, to a class A misdemeanor, see the record at
page 66.
On or about the 25th day of September, 2003, a jury trial was held and the
Appellant was convicted. The matter was continued to the 17th day of November,
2003, for sentencing. On or about the 2nd day of December, 2003, the court entered
its judgment, sentence, stay of execution of sentence, order of probation and
commitment which granted Appellant the privilege of probation, ordered that she pay
a restitution of eight hundred fifty-nine dollars and six cents ($859.06) and serve a
six (6) month jail term with work release. Also, she was to reimburse Iron County
two hundred dollars ($200.00) for the public defender services and pay a fine of one
thousand two hundred fifty dollars ($1,250.00) plus a twenty-five dollar ($25.00) court
security fee, a true and correct photocopy of the trial court's judgement, sentence,
stay of execution of sentence , order of probation and commitment is attached as
Exhibit A in the Appellant's addendum and incorporated herein by this reference.
Notice of appeal was filed on the 8th day of December, 2003, and on the 9th
day of January, 2004, J. Bryan Jackson was substituted as public defender
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appointee for purposes of appeal.

returned a verdict of guilty on all counts against the Appellant and the matter was
set for sentencing pending the preparation of a presentence investigation report. On
(

entered lis judgment,

sentence, stay of execution of sentence, and order of probation iivl rnmmitment,
see the record at page 147. A notice of appeal was filed on or about the 8th day of
December, 2003, see the record at page
The Appellant WHS SHI ill »IIIV( i

••>

< ICM'I IIIIOIIIH senieiu e siiiyt-M i.

She was placed on supervised probation for thirty-six (36) months, which included
incarceration of six (6) months in jail with work release. She was ordered to pay

and an additional fine and reimbursement fee in the total amount of one thousand
four hundred seventy-five dollars ($1,475.00).
D. STATEMENT oi l-ACTS. In August, 2001, there was entered an amended
order modifying decree of divorce between the Appellant and victim which had been
filed in the Fifth Judicial District Court, civil number 91490011*

.. required the

Respondent (the victim) to pay child support offivehundred ninety dollars ($590.00)

Page
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received from the Veteran's Administration were to be sent directly to the Petitioner
(the Appellant) for child support. See Trial Exhibit D-13, at the record at page 129,
a true and correct photocopy thereof being marked as Appellant's Exhibit B and the
same is attached hereto as part of the addendum and incorporated herein by this
reference. While the victim, Mr. Miller, was incarcerated, there was filed bank card
applications at State Bank of Southern Utah by Appellant and their daughter, Sydney
Miller, utilizing his account number, see State's Exhibits 2, 3,4 and 5, at the record
at page 129. The victim denied authorizing this action. In November, 2001, there
was filed with the United States Post Office a change of address so that the victim's
mail went directly to the Appellant. See Trial Exhibit P-1 at the record at page 129.
By the change of address and with the approval of the application, the Appellant
received a debit card and the access PIN number which allowed her to withdraw
monies from the victim's account at any ATM machine.

While the victim

acknowledged not paying child support during incarceration and that his V.A.
benefits had been on direct deposit with State Bank, he changed his testimony to
suggest that these funds were changed to a Zion's Account. He was not clear as to
now or when the benefits from the Veteran's Administration were deposited into his
account. He was elusive as to when the change occurred. He was elusive in giving
information about his income. The inquiry on cross examination was as follows:

Page 8 of
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Q. Did you receive any benefits from the Veteran's Administration?
A. Yes, I do.
Q. That's a soi
?
A. Yes, it is.
Q. And where do those funds go?
A. Those funds go to my bank account at State Bank.
Q . Okay. Have they always been on deposit in the State Bank
account?
A. No, they have not.
Q. When did that change?
A. That changed this year or last. It was this year in fact.
Q. Okay.
A. I believe in April or May.
Q. Okay. So, do you have a source of income?
A. That's correct.
Q. And did you h.wc .1 MUIII i> ol IIK nine IIIIIIIKI IIIC lime yini wine
incarcerated.
A. That's correct.
Q. And those funds did go into the State Bank account at that time.
A. No. They went into a different Bank at that time.
Q. Well, what bank was that, Sir?
A. That was Zion's bank.
Q. Okay, so what is the soi 1
II
I.ILiU^n located m II» : >I, iU
Bank account?
A. Air force retired bank.
Q. So you had retirement funds in addition to V. A. benefits, further
income during your period of incarceration.
A. That's correct. That's correct.
Q. And those - - the source of those funds were on deposit in State
Bank; in that correct?
A. That's true. I-Q. And during all that period of incarceration, sn
source of income?
A. No....
Q. Alright. During the time period when you were incarcerated, Mr.
Miller, did you pay child support?
A. No, of course not.
Q. And are you current paying child siippc
Page 9 of

27

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

A. Obviously not.
See trial transcript at pages 72-74.

However, his daughter, Sydney Miller

indicated that the action taken by Appellant was authorized by the victim. On direct
examination she stated as follows:
Q. Okay. During that conversation, did you talk about money?
A. Yes, we did.
Q. Why were you talking about money?
A. Because he was in jail and that's the only time we can get - - or,
when he's in jail, we get the V.A. money. And he doesn't have a job,
obviously, when he's in jail, so we were there to discuss that and get
that worked out.
Q. Do you understand what the V.A. money is being used for?
A. Child support.
Q. Okay. And on this particular occasion, you were having a
conversation with him related to child support?
A. Yes.
Q. What did he say?
A. He - - we took the - - the divorce decree in there. And it said that,
because he's in jail, we get the V.A. money. And he said, "Okay, fine."
Then you could go and get all the paper work and get it all filled out and
it will be easier for us to do it rather than for him to do it because of all
the - - the - - it'd just a long time and everything else to do it - - for him
to, like, do it through the mail and jail and stuff like that.
Q. And so he told you to go ahead and fill the applications.
A. Uh - Huh (affirmative).
Q. He told you to go ahead and sign them.
A. Uh - Huh (affirmative).
Q. And he told you to do that because it was hard for him to do that by
mail in jail.
A. Yes.
See trial transcript at pages 152 and 153.
Tristyn Miller, the victim's other daughter corroborated the conversation that
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occurred at the jail house but she was unclear on the details, see trial transcript at
pdtje'i l i l .mil IfV

Mie

,*IMI

suggested llnl hei l.jllii'i Inn I In manipulate her in

changing her testimony, see the trial transcript at pages 169 .nvl I/O

I l< ivvcvri, .*

visitor log record which was introduced as Exhibit P-26, see the record at page 129,
showed no visits by the Appellant, Sydney Miller or Tristyn Miller. Moreover, the
victim

*nied on re'

/

and/or Tristyn Miller, see the trial transcript at page 196.
A standard set of jury instructions was read to the jury which included
i

ur various legai term

is included the term

"purpose or intent to defraud" which was defined as simply . i i >i n i H ISH li I I ise H fals*
writing as if it were genuine in order to gain some advantage. See the record at
page i

he elements instruction for the offense of forgery as

that the Defendant (Appellant) acted with a purpose to defraud anyone, or with
knowledge that he was facilitating a fraud to be perpetuated by anyone see the
record at page 106
exception to the jury instructions or proposed verdict form, see the trial transcript at
page 193. However, there is nothing in the trial transcript or record suggesting that
t.

versight. Notwithstanding, it would have been more
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consistent with State v. Winward. 909 P.2d 909 (Utah App. 1995), had additional
qualifications been made regarding the charges of forgery and theft of property.
The jury returned its guilty verdict after deliberating for approximately one (1)
hour, see the trial transcript at page 228.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
A.
There was insufficient evidence to convict the appellant of the charges of
forgery and theft of property, no matter what inferences one might draw from the
evidence to support the jury verdict, because Appellant was entitled to the monies
she received as had been previously decreed and to which she had full entitlement
without further authorization as child support. Her questionable use of deceptive
means to acquire that which she was entitled to does not amount to fraud since the
victim had no legal right to retain the monies in his account and therefore the
unauthorized signature was not forger/ as found in State v. Winward. 909 P.2d 909
(Utah App. 1995). A forgery conviction cannot be sustained unless the act was done
in the furtherance of the intention to defraud the victim and not just anyone.
For the same reason, Appellant's entitlement to funds sequestered by the
victim, depriving Appellant from having access to property which by previous court
decree belonged to her. She had not exercised unauthorized control over property
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of another.

She merely acquired that property to which she had full right and

eiiiiilemeni,

Since the circumstances of this case, much like those of State v. Winward,
<i(ili I' Al Mil'i (III ih A|i|i I!i1 IM lequired an instruction more in keeping with the
facts than what the general languor nl lllrih ' , i H " AmH.ilM, k erli"ii !& h MM
(1953, as amended) might have otherwise required. The jury was not properly
instructed when the language made reference a purpose to defraud anyone, and

was the bank and not Mr. Miller. However, defense counsel did not object
exception to the trial court's instruction and therefore may have invited error after the
Utah

Supreme

Coml's

IIIIIIM

MI

y.

ueukqeuzean.

ZQb<

Notwithstanding, Appellant maintains
eliminates the manifest injustice exception of Rule 19(e), Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure, when applied to circumstances where there is a clear indication that the

Appellant asserts that in cases of such inadvertence the manifest injustice exception
should still apply

Pcty<
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c.
Where this case was one that required consideration of Appellant's entitlement
to the proceeds of the victim's account, the trial court erred in not including an
instruction or definition addressing her right or in clarifying the reason for the
evidence so as to not confuse the jury. Appellant believes that the appropriate
remedy is remand for new trial.
D.
Defense counsel's failure to take exception to the trial court's jury instruction
and in not submitting an instruction qualifying the standard instructions for forgery
and theft to account for the circumstances of the instant case together with his failure
to object to the testimony of bank ofTicials regarding reimbursement or by failing to
request a clarifying instruction excluding the jury's consideration of the bank as a
victim fails the Strickland test, being prejudicial and falling below the objective
standard of a reasonable professional. However, it is speculative to assume that the
jury would render a different verdict had they been properly instructed.
Notwithstanding, since the remedy would be for new trial and not a reversal, there
should be less of a need to speculate on the outcome.
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I

ARGUMENT
A.
AFTER MARSHALING THE EVIDENCE. THE APPELLANT ASSERTS THAT
THE SAME IS INSUFFICIENT TO CONVICT ON COUNTS I. II AND III.
FORGERY. A THIRD DEGREE FELONY AND THEFT. A CLASS A
MISDEMEANOR. WHERE SHE WAS ENTITLED TO THE FUNDS SHE
RECEIVED FROM HER EX-HUSBAND.
Where the issue appeals deals with sufficiency of evidence, in determining
whether a jury verdict should be set aside based on insufficient evidence this Court
has previously ruled in State v. Salas, 820 P. 2d 1386 (Utah App. 1991) as follows:
The evidence and the reasonable inferences which might be drawn
therefrom must be viewed in the light most favorable to the jury verdict.
A jury conviction is reversed for insufficient evidence only when the
evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently
improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable
doubt that the defendant committed the crime on which he [she] was
convicted.
See also State v.Johnson. 774 P.2d 1141-47 (Utah 1989). This Court has also held
in State v. Vessev. 967 P.2d 960, 966 (Utah App. 1998), that one challenging the
verdict must marshal the evidence and then demonstrate that it is insufficient when
viewed in the light most favorable to the jury verdict. The most obvious inference is
that the jury simply believed the victim, Andrew Miller, and chose not to believe the
testimony of the Appellant, or their daughters, Sydney Miller and Tristyn Miller. The
question must be asked, however, whether it is reasonable to infer under the
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circumstances of this case that one can steal or take unauthorized possession of that
which she by law is entitled. One clear fact that went undisputed and uncontroverted
at trial was Appellant's entitlement to the victim's V. A. benefits when he was
incarcerated. There is no question that Mr. Miller was incarcerated at the time the
monies were withdrawn from his account.

While Mr. Miller's testimony was

confusing as to whether the V.A. benefits were actually deposited in his State Bank
account or a Zion account, he offered no corroborating evidence to disaffirm or
question the established fact that the V.A. benefits were on direct deposit with State
Bank. The victim acknowledged that he had not paid child support and that he did
owe child support while he was incarcerated. The victim was untruthful as to his
sources of income when questioned at trial. In short, there was substantial evidence
suggesting that he was evading his obligation and elusive in testifying truthfully.
However, notwithstanding the factual issue as to whether the victim authorized the
Appellant to file an application, signing his name to it for purposes of accessing his
account for child support, the more essential question is one of her entitlement to
those funds. She needed no further authorization to receive the V.A. benefit money
since the previous modified court order had already granted her full authority and
entitlement. This is not a case where one exercises control over property of another
but a case where she used questionable means to get access to her own property.
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Hence, the Appellant contends that she had every right to possession and control of
her property even by the use of questionable means including the filing of an
application in behalf of her ex-husband to access the funds.
The situation in this case is not unlike that which was found in State v.
Winward. 909 P.2d 909 (Utah App. 1995) wherein the Utah Court of Appeals
determined that even the unethical conduct of an attorney was insufficient to support
a charge of forgery unless there was found to be a sufficient connection between the
act of forgery and the intent to defraud. In that case, this Court stated that the law
does not conclusively presume that because a person signed the name of another
a forgery has occurred. "The act of signing another's name without permission does
not constitute forgery unless it was done with the intent to defraud." Id at 912. This
Court went on to state that even if a defendant possessed both an intent to defraud
and commits the act of signing another's name without authority, a forgery conviction
cannot be sustained unless the act was done in the furtherance of that intention.
Stated another way, a defendant who has signed another's name without permission,
while possessing an intent to defraud that is completely unrelated to the
unauthorized endorsement has not committed forgery. Id at 913.
That case involved an unauthorized endorsement not unlike the facts and
circumstances of the instant case. In that case, this Court stated that the trial court
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had erred in allowing the State to present evidence suggesting that the defendant
had committed wrongful acts against other victims. In the instant case, the only
person who could have been defrauded is Andrew Miller. However, Andrew Miller,
given the language in the modified decree of divorce had no right to withhold funds
from the Appellant because such were to paid as child support when he was
incarcerated. Notwithstanding any inference that might be drawn on what the jury did
under the circumstances of this case, there is no basis for sustaining the forgery
conviction because the only possible victim, Andrew Miller, was not defrauded in any
way by her taking money that belonged to her which he had no right to withhold from
her. If there is no fraud, there can be no forgery.
Similarly, the same holds for the unauthorized exercise of property in the theft
charge. Where the charge requires that unauthorized control be made of property
of another, the charge cannot be sustained when the property that she exercised
control over is her own.
Certainly, what the Appellant did in this case was no different than what the
attorney did in Statev.Winward. except that under the circumstances her action was
not governed by the rules of professional conduct and therefore not unethical. In
light of this legal component which was clearly overlooked or not adequately
explained to the jury through instruction, there is no reasonable inference that can
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be drawn that to support the charges in this case.
B.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT PROPERLY INSTRUCT THE JURY AS TO THE
CHARGES IN THIS CASE OR BY WAY OF DEFINITION OR FURTHER
INSTRUCTION GIVEN THE CIRCUMSTANCES.
The Appellant points out that the instructions that were given at trial were
consistent with Utah Code Annotated, Section 76-6-501 (1953, as amended) which
states that a person is guilty of forgery if, with purpose to defraud anyone, [she]
makes any writings so that the writing or the making purports to be the act of another
(emphasis added). However, the Appellant also notes that there was no exception
made by her attorney at trial.

There is nothing further in the trial transcript

elaborating on what discussion may have taken place off the record. However, State
v. Winward. 909 P.2d 909 (Utah App. 1995) suggests that more limitation be given
as part of the instruction. In that case, this Court had a problem with defining
"purpose to defraud" as simply a purpose to use a false writing as if it were genuine
in order to gain some advantage" by stating that it failed to explain adequately the
distinction between the general and specific intent requirements or relate those
requirements to the facts of the case. Id at 914. See also State v. Potter. 627 P.2d
75 (Utah 1981). The same problem exists in the instant case. Evidence was
introduced in the instant case regarding the bank's reimbursement of the monies
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paid from the victim's account. The introduction of such evidence suggests, without
clearly identifying the victim in this case, that the bank could have been the victim.
Consequently, it is reasonable to conclude that the jury may have believed that the
bank was the victim. However, the only connection that can be made through the
endorsement is to Mr. Miller since the act in this case is the signing of his signature
to the application form. The separate act causing the bank to reimburse Mr. Miller's
account came as a result of his action not that of the Appellant. The introduction of
such evidence without proper instruction, created the same type of confusion and
similar circumstances to that of the Windward case. In short, the Appellant asserts
that given the circumstances, the nature of evidence introduced, and the form of
instruction given the jury was not properly instructed. Having said that, the Appellant
notes that the situation may be one where here the trial attorney invited error. In
State v. Geukqeuzean, 2004 UT. 16, the Utah Supreme Court reviewed a matter
where the trial court had failed to include an appropriate mens rea instruction and
this Court rejected the State's contention that the defendant invited error by omitting
the challenged element in his own proposed instructions. Notwithstanding, the
Supreme Court reversed stating that as in State v. Hamilton. 2003 UT 22,70 P.3d
111 (Utah 2003), where defense counsel confirmed on the record that it had no
objection to the instructions given by the trial court, the invited error doctrine applied.
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In that case, it recognized and acknowledged the defendant's failure to include a
separate mens rea element in his proposed instruction was most likely inadvertent
and not a deliberate attempt to mislead the trial court. Nevertheless, the Supreme
believed that like other cases discussed therein, the proposed jury instructions
effectively led the trial court into adopting an erroneous jury instruction that he then
challenged on appeal, see paragraph 12.
Unlike State v.Geukqeuzean. however, there is nothing in the trial transcript
and there is nothing on the record indicating what defense counsel's proposed
instructions were. There are proposed instructions made a part of the record by the
State. However, there appear to be no proposed jury instructions submitted by
defense counsel that are part of the record. All that defense counsel did in this case
is to not object to the instructions given as indicated in the trial transcript at page
193. Whether that was enough to invoke the invited error doctrine, is a matter that
this Court can decide for itself. The Appellant maintains that the purpose behind the
invited error doctrine was to discourage parties from intentionally misleading the trial
court and that something more than to assert to the court's instruction should be
required. In the instant case, defense counsel chose not to take exception to the
instructions given. Appellant suggests that there are other reasons for not taking
exception which are not intended to invite the trial court to commit error in its
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instruction. While the Appellant agrees that a jury instruction may not be assigned
as error if counsel, either by statement or act, affirmatively demonstrates his position
on the matter and does not object to the instruction, accord State v. Hamilton. 2003
UT 22, at T| 54, 70 P.3d 111, the Appellant maintains that error assigned to the
manifest injustice exception should still be maintained under circumstances that
clearly show inadvertence by all parties including the trial court. Appellant's
explanation as to why the more detailed instruction was not given in this case was
that it seems clearly to have been overlooked by all parties including the trial court
in this case. Moreover, unlike the other cases on this point, neither the record nor
the trial transcript offer any further insight.
C.
THE TRIAL ALSO ERRED IN NOT INCLUDING ANY INSTRUCTION OR
DEFINITION ADDRESSING APPELLANT'S RIGHT OR ENTITLEMENT TO THE
PROCEEDS OBTAINED.
Without readdressing the issues set forth in the previous section, the Appellant
further notes that under the circumstances of this case, it seems that it would have
been appropriate that a more definitive instruction be given concerning Appellant's
entitlement or right to proceeds in the victim's account. The Appellant believes that
failure to so instruct was similar to what this Court took exception to in State v.
Winward, by failing to relate the requirements to the facts of this particular case.
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Without limiting or qualifying the evidence, the same concerns would apply in the
instant case as this Court found to have likely confused the jury in the Winward case,
in that the jury is allowed to make inappropriate or unfair assumptions or inferences
as to who the victim is or what the nature of the injury might encompass. At the
same time, Appellant can see that like in the Winward case if it is determined that
she was convicted unfairly, she is entitled to a new trial and not an acquittal.
Therefore, the appropriate remedy would be to remand for such proceedings as
would be appropriate under the circumstances.
D.
WHERE DEFENSE COUNSEL FAILED TO PROPOSE A MORE DETAILED
INSTRUCTION QUALIFYING FORGERY AND THEFT AND THEN FAILED TO
TAKE EXCEPTION TO THE INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN BY THE COURT.
APPELLANT DID NOT RECEIVE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE AT TRIAL.
Appellant believes that the failure to include more definitive instruction was an
oversight by all parties. However, even as an oversight or considering the possibility
that defense counsel did not objection for reasons calculated toward the defense, the
question arises as to whether Appellant received effective assistance of counsel at
trial. The standard is that which has been set forth in Strictland v. Washington. 466
U.S. 668,689,104 S. Ct. 2052,2065,80 L .Ed. 2d 674 (1984), by the United States
Supreme Court. The two prong Strickland test is first to show that the representation
fell below the objective standard of a reasonable professional sufficiently to
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overcome the presumption that counsel rendered adequate assistance and
exercised reasonable professional judgment and second, there must a showing that
counsel's errors were prejudicial. Appellant can establish that she was convicted,
any further showing of prejudice is somewhat speculative in assuming that the jury
would render a different verdict had they been properly instructed. Likewise, if it was
defense counsel's strategy to not focus on the jury instruction but rather to limit
evidence that might come in which might be confusing, there comes to mind the
question as to why counsel did not object to the testimony of bank officials
reimbursing the victim of monies withdrawn from the victim's account. Counsel's
failure to object or otherwise qualify the testimony through instruction seems to call
into question whether effective assistance was rendered consistent with reasonable
professional judgment. Since the reliesf sought is requesting a new trial as opposed
to reversal, the Appellant contends that there is less of a need to speculate on the
outcome of the proceedings, as to whether it is reasonable^ probable that the
verdict be different.

A new jury would have the benefit of proper instruction

consistent with this Court's mandate on remand, accord Butterfield v. Cook. 817
P.2d 333, 336 (Utah App. 1991).
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CONCLUSION
On the grounds and for the reasons set forth above, the Appellant requests
that the matter be remanded for new trial with such instruction as the deems
appropriate together with such and further relief as to this Court appears equitable
and proper.
DATED this

J. BRYyysMACKSON,
Attorney forAppellant Miller
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TROY A. LITTLE (#9061)
Chief Deputy Iron County Attorney
97 North Main, Suite #1
P.O. Box 428
Cedar City, Utah 84720
Telephone: (435) 586-6694
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

JUDGMENT, SENTENCE, STAY OF
EXECUTION OF SENTENCE, ORDER
OF PROBATION, and COMMITMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.

Criminal No. 021501335

ROBYN LYNN MILLER,
11/18/64

Judge J. Philip Eves

Defendant.

The Defendant, ROBYN LYNN MILLER, having been found of guilty by a jury trial of
the offense(s) of three (3) counts of Forgery, each a Third-Degree Felony; Unlawful Use of a
Financial Transaction Card, a Third-Degree Felony; and Theft of Property, a Class A
Misdemeanor, on September 25, 2003, and the above-entitled matter having been called on for
sentencing November 17, 2003, in Parowan, Utah, and the above-named Defendant, ROBYN
LYNN MILLER, having appeared before the Court in person together with her attorney of
record, Dale Sessions, and the State of Utah having appeared by and through Deputy Iron County
Attorney Troy A. Little, and the Court having reviewed the sentencing recommendation and
having further reviewed the file in detail and thereafter having heard statements from the
Defendant, her attorney, and the Deputy Iron County Attorney, and the Court being fully advised
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in the premises now makes and enters the following Judgment, Sentence, Stay of Execution of
Sentence, Order of Probation, and Commitment, to wit:
JUDGMENT
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the Defendant,
ROBYN LYNN MILLER has been convicted upon her plea of guilty to the offense of three (3)
counts of Forgery, each a Third-Degree Felony; Unlawful Use of a Financial Transaction Card, a
Third-Degree Felony; and Theft of Property, a Class A Misdemeanor, a, and the Court having
asked whether the Defendant had anything to say in regard to why judgment should not be
pronounced, and no sufficient cause to the contrary being shown or appearing to the Court, it is
adjudged that the Defendant is guilty as charged and convicted.
SENTENCE
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendant, ROBYN LYNN MILLER, and pursuant
to her conviction of three (3) counts of Forgery, each a Third-Degree Felony, is hereby sentenced
to a term of zero to five (0-5) years in the Utah State Prison for each count..
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendant, ROBYN LYNN MILLER, pay afinein
the sum and amount offivethousand dollars ($5,000 ), plus an eighty-five percent (85%)
surcharge for each count, for her conviction of the offense(s).
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendant, ROBYN LYNN MILLER, and pursuant
to her conviction of Unlawful Use of a Financial Transaction Card, a Third-Degree Felony, is
hereby sentenced to a term of zero tofive(0-5) years in the Utah State Prison.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendant, ROBYN LYNN MILLER, pay afinein
the sum and amount offivethousand dollars ($5,000), plus an eighty-five percent (85%)
surcharge for, for her conviction of the offense(s).
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendant, ROBYN LYNN MILLER, and pursuant
to her conviction of Theft of Property, a Class A Misdemeanor, is hereby sentenced to a term of
one (1) year in the Iron County Jail.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendant, ROBYN LYNN MILLER, pay afinein
the sum and amount of two thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500), plus an eighty-five percent
(85%) surcharge for, for her conviction of the offense(s).
STAY OF EXECUTION OF SENTENCE
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the execution of the terms of imprisonment imposed and
thefinesimposed in this case are hereby stayed, pending the Defendant's strict adherence to and
compliance with the following terms and conditions of probation.
ORDER OF PROBATION
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the Defendant,
ROBYN LYNN MILLER is hereby placed on supervised probation for a period of thirty-six (36)
months, to strictly comply with the following terms, provisions, and conditions:
1.

The Defendant shall forthwith make and execute a formal agreement provided by

the Utah Department of Adult Probation and Parole, and during the period of probation set forth
herein, shall strictly conform with all the terms, provisions, and conditions, and the same are
hereby made a part of this Order by means of incorporation.
2.

That the Defendant shall report as ordered and required by the Court and the

department of Adult Probation and Parole during the period of this probation.
3.

That the Defendant shall commit no law violations.

4.

That the Defendant shall obtain a mental health evaluation and enter, complete,

and pay for any recommended treatment as a result of that evaluation.
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5.

That the Defendant shall pay restitution in the amount of eight hundred and fifty-

nine dollars and six cents. ($859.06). However, the execution of said restitution is stayed for a
period of six (6) months.
6.

That the Defendant shall serve six (6) months in the Iron County Jail. The

Defendant may have work release. Defendant is ordered to report to jail on December 10,2003,
by 10 a.m.
7.

That the Defendant shall reimburse Iron County two hundred dollars ($200) for

the services of the Public Defender.
8.

That the Defendant shall pay a fine in the amount of one thousand two hundred

and fifty dollars ($1,250), plus a twenty-five dollar ($25) Court Security Fee.
COMMITMENT
TO THE SHERIFF OF IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH:
YOU ARE HEREBY COMMANDED to take the Defendant, ROBYN LYNN MILLER,
and deliver her to the Iron County Jail in Cedar City, Utah, there to be kept and confined in
accordance with the above and foregoing Judgment, Sentence, Stay of Execution of Sentence,
Order of Probation, and Commitment.

si/id

.

J?ece^tdw

DATED thisg^— day of November, 2003.

&Y£

BY THE COURT:

{f

&<

' ~ '

W.PJtflip Eves

f

District Court Judge

t
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CERTIFICATE
STATE OF UTAH

)
:ss.
COUNTY OF IRON )

'

I, CAROLYN BULLOCH, Clerk of the Fifth Judicial District Court in and for Iron
County, State of Utah, hereby certify that the foregoing is a full, true and exact copy of the
original Judgment, Sentence, Stay of Execution of Sentence, Order of Probation, and
Commitment in the case entitled State of Utah vs. ROBYN LYNN MILLER. Criminal No.
021501335, now on file and of record in my office.
WITNESS my hand and the seal of said office in Cedar City, County of Iron, State of
Utah, this c=>C day ofSo^sfeer, 2003.

gmmBULLOCH

CARQ
District Court Clerk
( S E A L )

:] By
'jj Deputy
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AUG 2 3 2001
5th DISTRICT COURT
IRONOOUIMTY
DEPUTY CLERK

THE PARK FIRM, P. C
JAMES M. PARK (5408)
141 North Main, Suite 200
P.O. Box 765
Cedar City, UT 84720
Telephone: (435) 586-6532

IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF IRON COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

ROBYN L. MILLER,

]
)
])
)

Petitioner,

AMENDED
ORDER MODIFYING
DECREE OF DIVORCE

vs.
ANDREW L. MILLER,
Respondent.

])
i
]

Civil No. 914900110
Judge J. Philip Eves

The above-referenced matter came on regularly for Pretrial, pursuant to notice, on
Monday, November 6,2000 before the Honorable J. Philip Eves, District Judge. Respondent
was present and represented by Floyd W Holm. Petitioner was also present and represented by
James M. Park, THE PARK FIRM, P.C.. The parties entered into a Stipulation in open court
and on the record. Based upon the Stipulation of the parties and good cause appearing therefor,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Decree of Divorce
in the above-referenced matter be, and the same is, modified as follows:
1. Respondent shall pay to Petitioner as and for child support the sum of $590.00 per
month, effective November 1, 1998, which child support shall continue until each child reaches
1
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the age of 18 or graduates from high school with her regular graduating class, whichever shall
first occur. Such child support shall be subject to modification when each child reaches majority
and in accordance with then existing Utah Child Support Guidelines. Should the Respondent be
unemployed or incarcerated, all funds which Respondent receives from the VA should be sent
directly to Petition for child support.
2. Both parties shall be required to keep and maintain health, dental and optical insurance
for the benefit of the minor children when such is available at reasonable cost. All other
expenses, past and present, including Sylvan Learning Center, shall be split equally between the
parties. The total cost through August 1, 2001 for the Sylvan Learning Center, Southwest
Center, and Orthodontic expenses is $11,360.00 and/or the Respondent's share totals $5,680.00.
3. To obtain appropriate health insurance, Respondent shall supply Petitioner with a
completed application for insurance coverage through the Veterans Administration and
Respondent shall have seven (7) days to get said insurance activated.
4. Respondent shall be entitled to take credit for lA of any health insurance premiums he
must pay for the exclusive benefit of the parties minor children and the same may be credited
against his child support obligation.
5. Respondent shall be entitled to visitation of the minor children of the parties subject to
the following terms and conditions:
(A)

Respondent shall immediately enroll in a parenting course through an
appropriate provider;

(B)

Pending completion of the parenting course, Respondent shall be entitled
2
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to visitation of the minor children every other Saturday from noon until
6:00 p.m. Commencing Saturday, November 11, 2000;
(C)

Petitioner shall do everything possible to encourage visits by the minor
children with Respondent but, because of the age of the children, they
shall have the ultimate decision as to whether visits shall occur;

(D)

Upon completion of the parenting course, visitation shall be expanded
upon the agreement of the parties. If the parties are unable to agree upon
such expanded visitation, then either party may request a hearing before
the court to further set a visitation schedule.

6. Neither party shall make or cause any other person to make derogatory statements
about the other in the presence of the children.
7. As long as the parties minor child Tristan is attending the Sylvan Learning Center,
both parties shall share equally any and all travel expenses related to transporting the parties
minor child to St. George to attend said Learning Center.
8. Except as modified herein above, the Decree of Divorce previously entered by the
Court shall remain in full force and effect.

, y ^ v ^ v - - ^£

DATED this£%7- day of August, 2001.
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ILIP EVES
STATE O F UTAH
COUNTY OF IRON
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)
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I, the undersigned Clerk of the FIFTH DISTRICT COURT, certify that this document is a true
copy of the original document on file in the
clerk's office.
(WITNES^)
SS) m^
my hand^n^ seal of the court
onthisdatfe

M

^1

E

Clerk of Court of Deputy Clerk
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I do hereby certify that on the /Slay of August, 2001, a true and correct unsigned
copy of the foregoing was mailed, first class, postage prepaid to:
Mr. Floyd W Holm
Attorney At Law
392 East 6400 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84107
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the

day of

, 20

, I did

mailed a true and correct photocopy of the BRIEF OF APPELLANT MILLER, byway
of U.S. mail, postage fully prepaid, thereon, to the following:
SCOTT GARRETT
IRON COUNTY ATTORNEY
97 North Main Street, Suite 1
Post Office Box 428
Cedar City, Utah 84721-0428

MARK L. SHURTLEFF
ATTORNEY GENERAL
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
COURT OF APPEALS
450 South State Street, Suite 500
Post Office Box 140230
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0230
ROBYN LYNN MILLER
P.O. Box 254
Cedar City, UT 84721-0254

LAURA LEE,
Legal Secretary
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